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The regulation of a woman’s behavior during pregnancy (pregnancy
behavior) has become a prominent and controversial issue within the legal
system.1 Some women have been forced to engage in treatments favoring
their unborn child at the expense of their own health or wishes,2 or have
been punished for their pregnancy behavior.3 Specifically, legal actors
have punished pregnant women for using illegal drugs while pregnant,
forced pregnant women to undergo HIV testing, and coerced them into
following doctors’ orders (e.g., undergoing a Cesarean section).4 These
legal actions have created a special category of people within the legal
system: pregnant women. Although the law does not generally force
people to have medical treatments,5 examples of the treatment pregnant
1. See generally LAURA E. GOMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS,
PROSECUTORS, AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE (1997) (describing
how hospitals drug test pregnant women and then turn over the results to law
enforcement for prosecution of maternal substance abuse); Leslie Ayers, Is Mama a
Criminal? An Analysis of Potential Criminal Liability of HIV-Infected Pregnant
Women in the Context of Mandated Drug Therapy, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 293, 314 (2002)
(arguing that drug treatments should be mandatory for pregnant women with HIV to
protect the health and welfare of the fetus); Brian Bornstein, Pregnancy, Drug Testing,
and the Fourth Amendment: Legal and Behavioral Implications, 17 J. FAM. PSYCHOL.
220, 220, 227 (2003) (predicting the creation of policies that will effectively prosecute
women for illegal drug use during pregnancy, while avoiding the constitutional pitfalls
previously encountered); Jennifer Brown, A Troublesome Maternal-Fetal Conflict:
Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues Surrounding Mandatory AZT Treatment of HIV
Positive Pregnant Women, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 67, 68 (2000) (arguing that pregnant
women should have the same opportunity to refuse medical treatment as other members
of society).
2. See In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that
the state’s interest as parens patriae in protecting the life of an unborn child—even
before viability—negates a woman’s right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious
grounds); Crouse Irving Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444-46
(App. Div. 1985) (holding that a pregnant woman may not refuse medical treatment
despite her religious convictions when the treatment is necessary to preserve either the
health and welfare of the unborn child or the life of the mother).
3. Carolyn Coffey, Note, Whitner v. State: Aberrational Judicial Response or
Wave of the Future for Maternal Substance Abuse Cases?, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 211, 212 (1997) (finding that over the past twenty years, criminal charges for
endangering fetuses during pregnancy through “drug use or other actions” have been
leveled against more than two hundred women in thirty states).
4. See Crouse Irving Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (requiring a woman
in labor to allow the physician to stabilize her condition with a blood transfusion after
she lost a significant amount of blood); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 936-37 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. 1986) (holding that a viable fetus was a child under Ohio’s existing child
abuse statute, and thus convicting the mother of child abuse for her prenatal conduct—
consuming cocaine and heroin); Brown, supra note 1, at 73-74 (stating that the 1996
amendments to the Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act and recent state
legislation have created either mandatory HIV testing and counseling or a move
towards such a mandate).
5. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (holding
that a competent individual has a constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical care).
But see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905) (upholding a mandatory
vaccination law to halt the spread of smallpox because the liberty interest secured by
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women receive demonstrate the legal system’s willingness to force
pregnant mothers to have medical procedures even though they may wish
to avoid such treatment because of religious or other personal reasons.6
This Article will argue that these legal actions may not only jeopardize the
legal rights and health of women in general, but also unfairly target
minority women.
The purpose of this Article is to provide an analysis based on
psychological research and theory to determine whether regulating
pregnancy behaviors has a discriminatory effect on minority women, and if
so, discuss its implications on state and national policy. Part I reviews the
various pregnancy behaviors that have been regulated and the controversy
surrounding regulation. Part II presents evidence from psychological
research and theory that suggests minority women could be
disproportionately affected. Part III provides policy suggestions and
recommendations for preventing or reducing the bias against minority
women. Finally, Part IV concludes that broad changes need to be made at
a societal level to eliminate the bias against minority women. This Article
provides a unique analysis of this issue by applying psychological research
and theory to examine a possible legal bias against minority women. Using
the Health Belief Model (HBM), this Article explains why minority women
make health decisions about their pregnancy that may put them at greater
risk of being prosecuted.
I. REGULATION OF PREGNANCY BEHAVIORS AND VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
This Part outlines the legal system’s attempt to make a woman legally
responsible for the health and welfare of her fetus by regulating HIV
testing and treatment, prenatal drug use, and adherence to doctors’ orders.
This Part also explores how these regulations infringe on various
constitutional rights, including the right to religious freedom, the right to
privacy, and the right to bodily autonomy.7
the Constitution is not an absolute right and because “a community has the right to
protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its
members”); Singleton v. Norris, 992 S.W.2d 768, 769-70 (Ark. 1999) (upholding the
decision to force a death row inmate to take antipsychotic medication because “[t]he
State has a due process obligation to provide appropriate medical care to persons in its
custody” and because the medication was also necessary to protect the well-being of
others, including inmates and guards). See generally Brown, supra note 1, at 82-83
(discussing whether the holding of Cruzan suggests that an HIV-positive pregnant
woman could refuse Azidothymidine (AZT) treatments, especially if the state has a
compelling interest in the health and welfare of the child).
6. See generally Ayers, supra note 1, at 299-301 (claiming that if the right to
refuse medical care is not absolute, then the interests of preventing the spread of HIV
might be compelling enough to sustain a state law requiring mandatory AZT
treatment).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (religious freedom); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (right to privacy); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
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A. Regulation of Pregnancy Behaviors
1. HIV Testing and Treatment
There are two areas in which the legal system attempts to regulate HIV
testing and treatment for pregnant women: mandatory HIV testing and
forced Azidothymidine (AZT) treatment. Some state legislatures have
considered legislation that would mandate HIV testing for all pregnant
women.8 In fact, Connecticut and New York allow hospitals to conduct
HIV tests for pregnant women even when women do not specifically agree
to the test. Although no state legislature currently has a mandatory HIV
testing policy for pregnant women, most state policies either require
hospitals to strongly lobby pregnant women to consent to prenatal HIV
testing (opt-in approach) or notify pregnant women that an HIV test will be
included in a standard set of prenatal tests and procedures if they do not
refuse it (opt-out approach).9
Additionally, because medical research has determined that the drug
AZT may help prevent the transmission of HIV to the fetus,10 prosecutors
(1992) (upholding women’s right to pre-viability abortion); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (right to refuse medical treatment); see also Casey,
505 U.S. at 851 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (finding that the Constitution protects
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education because “[t]hese matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment”); In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), appeal denied, 698
N.E.2d 543 (Ill. 1998) (right to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds). See
generally Brown, supra note 1, at 80-87 (outlining the various constitutional issues
presented by the regulation of pregnancy behaviors).
8. See Brown, supra note 1, at 74-75 (summarizing various federal and state
mandatory testing initiatives); Jennifer Cooper, The Politics of Pediatric AIDS, 3
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 53, 59 (1996) (discussing New York Assembly Bill No. 6747B, which, if passed, would have required confidential HIV-related information to be
disclosed to the mother of a newborn if the child was tested for any purpose).
9. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV Testing Among Pregnant
Women–United States and Canada, 1998–2001, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 1013, 1016 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5145.pdf
(comparing the number of women who responded that they had, had not, or did not
know if they had received an HIV test during pregnancy in opt-in and opt-out
approaches); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1204(a) (West 2008) (requiring an
opt-in approach: “[a]s a routine component of prenatal care, every licensed health care
provider who renders the primary prenatal care, regardless of the site of such practice,
shall advise every pregnant woman who is his or her patient of the value of testing for
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection and shall request of each such
pregnant women informed consent to such testing.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-55
(West 2008) (requiring hospitals to test any newborn whose mother was not HIV tested
during pregnancy and inform the mother of the results). See generally Bonita de Boer,
HIV Testing in Pregnancy, http://www.avert.org/hiv-testing-pregnancy.htm (2008)
(stating that mandatory HIV testing of newborns raises several ethical questions, such
as possibly disclosing the mother’s HIV status without her consent, thereby evading her
right to privacy).
10. See Div. of AIDS, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases et al.,
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have brought criminal charges against pregnant women for refusing to
undergo AZT treatment.11 For example, Kathleen Tyson, an HIV-positive
woman in Oregon, quit AZT treatments because of the side effects and her
fear that the powerful drugs would harm her fetus.12 After the child was
born, she refused to allow the doctors to administer AZT drug treatments to
her child and continued to breastfeed despite doctors’ orders to stop.
Although Tyson and her husband felt they were making a good choice for
their child (i.e., believing that breast milk was better than formula), the
hospital disagreed. Tyson was charged with “intent to harm” and the court
issued an emergency order that reinforced the doctor’s instructions.13
These actions demonstrate the willingness of legal actors to force
mothers to engage in behavior that will protect the fetus, while
compromising the mothers’ health or personal autonomy. As discussed in
the following section, the criminal prosecution of women who use drugs
during pregnancy also relies heavily on this notion that the fetus’s wellbeing, at least in some circumstances, should be placed above other
considerations.
2. Illegal Drug Use
In addition to HIV testing and treatment, the legal system has also
attempted to address maternal drug use during pregnancy, even where laws
are not in place to address this issue specifically.14 Antidrug distribution
Zidovudine for the Prevention of HIV Transmission from Mother to Child, 43
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 285, 286 (1994), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm4316.pdf (finding that the treatment of AZT,
a.k.a. zidovudine, resulted in a 67.5% reduction in the risk of HIV transmission from
mother to fetus in a study using 364 births); id. at 285 (noting that mother-to-infant
transmission is the leading cause of HIV infections in children); Brown, supra note 1,
at 70 (noting that AZT administered to a group of HIV-infected women during
pregnancy and labor, and later to their newborns, reduced the risk of prenatal HIV
transmission from 25% to 8%).
11. E.g., George Kent, The Tysons’ Missing Testimony 1 (Nov. 20, 1999)
(unpublished paper, available at http://www2.hawaii.edu/~kent/tysons.pdf) (restating
testimony used in the case of Kathleen Tyson, a mother who was criminally charged
for refusing AZT treatments for her son); see also Brown, supra note 1, at 71 (noting
that AZT can cause short-term effects ranging from simple headaches to bone marrow
suppression and seizures, and that its long-term effects are unknown).
12. See Kathleen Tyson, In the Eye of the Storm: A Mother’s True Story of
Confronting AIDS, Fate, and the State, MOTHERING, Sept. 2001, available at
http://www.
mothering.com/articles/new_baby/breastfeeding/eye-of-storm.html
(arguing that she did not want to expose her son to the serious side effects posed by
AZT and that she chose breast milk because of its higher nutrition and immune system
support than formula); Kent, supra note 11, at 1.
13. See Tyson, supra note 12; Kent, supra note 11, at 1.
14. See In re “Male” R., 422 N.Y.S.2d 819, 825 (Fam. Ct. 1979) (finding that a
mother’s prenatal abuse of barbiturates and alcohol may constitute neglect and an
action by social services to terminate the mother’s custody was not inappropriate); see
also Coffey, supra note 3, at 216.
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laws and “fetal abuse” statutes, where child abuse statutes are applied to
include maternal prenatal conduct, have frequently been used to prosecute
pregnant women for drug use.15 Where the state successfully criminally
prosecutes mothers under child abuse and neglect statutes, the state will
assume temporary custody over the child or terminate a mother’s parental
rights.16 During the past twenty years, at least two hundred women have
been charged under these laws with “drug use or other actions”—such as
drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes, or consuming illegal narcotics—for
putting a fetus in danger.17 For example, in 2004, an Oklahoma woman
was charged with first-degree murder when doctors said the woman’s
illegal drug use caused her baby to be stillborn.18 The Oklahoma state law
under which the woman was charged allows for murder charges to be filed
if an individual’s actions brought about the death of a viable fetus, which in
the state of Oklahoma is legally defined as twenty-four weeks into a
pregnancy.19
Additionally, states have also attempted to control substance abuse
behavior during pregnancy through hospital drug testing and prosecution.20
In 1999, at least thirteen states required public hospitals to test pregnant
women who were suspected of drug abuse, and report results to social
services or the police.21 In 2001, the Supreme Court found a South
Carolina hospital’s policy unconstitutional.22 The policy required hospital
15. See Coffey, supra note 3, at 224-32 (outlining and analyzing cases where state
prosecutors used antidrug distribution laws and child endangerment and abuse statutes
in attempts to convict pregnant women of prenatal substance abuse).
16. See id. at 216 (noting that terminating parental rights to gain permanent custody
of a fetus is “based on the theory that the mother’s prenatal conduct is probative of
future mistreatment of the child”); see also In re Milland, 548 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999 (Fam.
Ct. 1989) (holding that the child would be placed in danger if in the mother’s custody
because of her prenatal alcohol use and unwillingness to accept treatment for her
alcohol dependency); In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (holding that a
mother’s unborn child could be considered a “person” in order to receive protection
from the mother’s misuse of alcohol under the Family Court Act); In re “Male” R., 422
N.Y.S.2d 819 (Fam. Ct. 1979) (holding that a child born suffering from mild drug
withdrawal when his mother was an abuser of barbiturates was sufficient evidence to
determine that the child was neglected); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. 1986) (holding that a viable fetus is a “child” under a child abuse statute, and
that the mother’s use of heroin prior to the child’s delivery was sufficient evidence that
the child’s addiction to heroin was a result of prenatal substance abuse).
17. Coffey, supra note 3, at 211.
18. Reuters, Woman Charged Over Stillbirth, Sept. 10, 2004, http://tvnz.co.nz/view
/news_world_story_skin/446983%3Fformat=html.
19. Id. (noting that Oklahoma recognizes viability twenty-four weeks into a
pregnancy).
20. See Enid Logan, The Wrong Race, Committing Crime, Doing Drugs, and
Maladjusted for Motherhood: The Nation’s Fury over “Crack Babies,” 26 SOC. JUST.
115, 118, 120 (1999).
21. Id. at 120.
22. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85-86 (2001) (determining that
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staff to test pregnant women for cocaine and report positive results to law
enforcement so that the mother could be prosecuted.23 The Court made the
following two rulings: (1) the urine tests were “searches” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) the tests, and subsequent
reporting of positive results, were unreasonable searches absent patient
consent.24 While part of the Court’s ruling protects the privacy rights of
mothers, the Court noted that these searches are allowed if the state can
show a “special need” outside of a general interest in crime control.25
Hospital drug testing programs and prenatal drug use prosecution are
two ways in which the mother is held legally responsible for the health and
welfare of her fetus.26
3. Doctors’ Orders
Courts and prosecutors have also attempted to regulate pregnant
women’s adherence to doctors’ orders.27 The decisions by some doctors to
seek court orders forcing women to have Cesarean sections (C-sections)
have been particularly controversial.28 While the majority of cases have
ended with the mother successfully giving birth without intervention, there
have been cases where courts have authorized the performance of Csections over the objections of the pregnant women because doctors
convinced the courts that such medical intervention was necessary to
preserve the health or life of the fetus.29 Women have also been prosecuted
for refusing C-sections after their doctors determined that the procedure
was needed to save the life of their fetuses. In 2004, for example, a
prosecutor in Utah brought murder charges against Melissa Rowland after
she delayed a C-section that doctors claimed would have saved the life of
the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine cannot
justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is
unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant).
23. Id. at 70, 72.
24. Id. at 76, 81-84.
25. Id. at 67.
26. See Id. at 70-72; Logan, supra note 20, at 118, 120.
27. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the
Doctor’s Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 452, 47980 (2000); see also Nancy Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of
Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1951 (1986).
28. See Rhoden, supra note 27, at 1953 (arguing that “abortion law, properly
interpreted, precludes nonconsensual surgery”).
29. See In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233, 2233, 2240 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1986) (upholding a court order forcing a woman to have a C-section against her will);
David Weiss, Court Delivers Controversy: Mom Rejects C-sections; Gives Birth on
Own Terms, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre, Pa.), Jan. 16, 2004, at 1A (describing a
court order granting a hospital permission to perform a C-section against a patient’s
will); see also SHEENA MEREDITH, POLICING PREGNANCY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
OBSTETRIC CONFLICT 64-65 (2005).
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one of her unborn twins.30 In another case in Illinois, the State sought a
court order requiring Tabita Bricci, a pregnant woman, to submit to a Csection after she refused the procedure on religious grounds.31
In another instance, a doctor sought a court order against a woman to
force her to receive a blood transfusion.32 The doctor believed the
transfusion was necessary to save the lives of both the mother and her
fetus.33 The mother refused the transfusion, however, maintaining that it
was against her religion.34 A hearing was held immediately in an Illinois
circuit court during which the state asked that a temporary custodian be
appointed for the fetus.35 The custodian was given the right to consent to at
least one blood transfusion, and more if the necessity arose.36 Over the
next two days, the mother received six units of blood and delivered a
healthy baby.37 This is one of many such cases.
These examples indicate that the constitutional rights of women are
being violated because of their pregnancy status.
B. Violation of Rights
The controversies surrounding the decisions by courts and prosecutors
noted above arose because attempts to regulate pregnancy behavior often
infringe upon the constitutional rights of the mother. First, forcing a
woman to undergo a medical procedure or regulating a woman’s behavior
while pregnant violates the right to bodily autonomy as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.38 The right of pregnant women to refuse
30. Alexandria Sage, Utah C-Section Mom Gets Probation, CBS NEWS, Apr. 29,
2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/12/national/main605537.shtml.
31. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 327, 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), cert.
denied, Baby Boy Doe v. Mother Doe, 510 U.S. 1168 (1994); see also RACHEL ROTH,
MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL RIGHTS 90 (2000) (stating that
“pregnant women increasingly find themselves subject to a political mandate to
conduct themselves in ways” that doctors, legislatures, and courts deem best); id. at 128
(stating that requests to review the appellate court’s decision in the case of Tabita
Bricci were denied and that Bricci gave birth naturally to a healthy baby).
32. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), appeal denied, 698
N.E.2d 543 (Ill. 1998).
33. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 399.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 400, 406 (reversing the decision of the circuit court because “the circuit
court erred in appointing a temporary custodian for Fetus Brown with the authority to
consent to blood transfusions for Darlene Brown, and erred in appointing the public
guardian ad litem for Fetus Brown”).
37. Id. at 400.
38. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990) (finding
bodily integrity as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and stating that a competent person has a right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment).
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treatment that may benefit their fetuses has been upheld in several cases.39
However, a woman’s right to bodily autonomy has been undercut by the
State’s interest in protecting unborn human life. In Roe v. Wade, the
Supreme Court found that the word “person” does not extend to the
“unborn,”40 but nonetheless found that the point at which the State’s
interest becomes “compelling” is at fetal viability.41 In the years since Roe,
the Supreme Court has modified and restricted a woman’s right to bodily
autonomy, while expanding the ability of the State to intervene for the
benefit of the unborn.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court rejected the trimester
framework created in Roe, finding that this framework “undervalues the
State’s interest in potential life.”42 As a result, when a woman becomes
pregnant, her medical decisions are potentially subject to governmental
intervention. Whether a court forces a woman to engage in a particular
medical procedure often depends upon which of two lines of reasoning a
judge decides to follow.43 A judge that draws upon cases emphasizing the
right to be free from unwanted medical procedures will more likely defer to
a woman’s wishes, while a judge emphasizing the State’s “compelling
interest” in the potential life of the fetus will more likely approve a forced
procedure.44
Regulation of women’s behavior during pregnancy also violates the right
to privacy, which the Supreme Court has found to be a fundamental liberty
inherent in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.45
In Casey, the Supreme Court affirmed an individual’s right to personal
autonomy.46 As part of the constitutionally protected right to privacy, the
39. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), cert.
denied, Baby Boy Doe v. Mother Doe, 510 U.S. 1168 (1994); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v.
Jackson, 510 A.2d 562, 565 (Md. 1986).
40. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
41. Id. at 163.
42. 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (affirming Roe’s central holding that a woman has a
right to terminate her pregnancy before viability, but rejecting the trimester framework
as not part of the essential holding of Roe).
43. See Samantha Catherine Halem, Note, At What Cost?: An Argument Against
Mandatory AZT Treatment of HIV-Positive Pregnant Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 491, 506-07 (1997) (comparing judges who rely on the right to refuse medical
treatment with judges who consider the compelling state interest in protecting the
unborn child).
44. See id.
45. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that the “the
right to be left alone” is “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men” and that “to protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment”), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
46. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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Court has confirmed the right of the individual to make certain kinds of
choices freely, such as whether to terminate a pregnancy47 or use
contraception.48 However, the Court circumscribed the right to privacy in
order to protect a viable fetus. While the Court implied an unqualified
right to privacy where reproductive rights were at issue in Griswold v.
Connecticut,49 the Court’s later decision in Roe held that government
intrusion of an individual’s privacy is justified when the State can
demonstrate a compelling or substantial government interest sufficient to
outweigh the privacy interest.50
Finally, regulation of a pregnant woman’s behavior violates the right to
informed consent: if an individual does not consent, a doctor should not
force a procedure on a patient, even when considered medically
necessary.51 The right to informed consent is particularly at issue when a
patient refuses treatment for religious reasons.52 However, courts have
overridden this right when the State demonstrates a sufficiently compelling
countervailing interest in protecting a viable fetus, and accordingly, these
courts have forced medical procedures upon unwilling mothers.53 In one
example, although the presiding judge in In re Jamaica Hospital
recognized that the pregnant patient had “an important and protected
interest in the exercise of her religious beliefs,”54 he nonetheless forced her
to have a procedure because he felt compelled to “consider the life of the
unborn fetus.”55
Despite the Supreme Court’s decisions in Roe and Casey clearly
recognizing the competing state interest in the life of a viable fetus, many
47. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (concluding that the right of
personal privacy includes a woman’s decision whether to terminate her pregnancy).
48. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
49. Id.
50. See id.; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 127-30 (holding that the fetus’s development
was a critical factor in both the woman’s right to privacy and State’s interest in
potential life and that a woman’s right to privacy gives way to the State’s interest in
potential life at the point where the fetus “has the capability of meaningful life outside
the mother’s womb”).
51. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 593 (1977) (recognizing an “interest
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”); see also Schloendorff
v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Justice Cardozo noted that
“[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient’s consent commits an assault”).
52. See In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (App. Div. 1985) (reasoning
that while a patient has a constitutionally protected right to practice her religion, the life
of the unborn fetus must also be weighed in medical choices).
53. See id.; see also In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233, 2240 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1986).
54. In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900.
55. See id.
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researchers and legal scholars believe that a woman does not relinquish any
rights when she becomes pregnant.56 The Supreme Court, however, has yet
to hear a case concerning the regulation of a pregnant woman’s behavior
and choices, other than on the issue of abortion. Thus the window remains
open for the argument that women’s right to be free from forced medical
procedures trumps even the “compelling state interest” identified in Roe
and Casey.
II. DISPROPORTIONATE HARM TO MINORITY WOMEN
Legal actions regulating pregnancy behavior demonstrate how women’s
rights have been marginalized through the legal system.57 In addition,
psychological research and theory suggests that the regulation of pregnancy
behavior may disproportionately affect minority women.58 Researchers
developed a theoretical model demonstrating how individuals process
health information and arrive at decisions, the Health Belief Model
(HBM).59 Characteristics prevalent among minority women in the U.S.
may affect the information available to them and their subsequent
decisions. Specifically, personal characteristics, such as education or
income level, have a significant influence on the decisions minority women
make about pregnancy behavior and could increase the probability that they
will be affected by legal regulation of pregnancy.60
Studies have found that minority women have lower levels of trust in the
medical system, higher arrest rates, and lower socioeconomic status than

56. See, e.g., Halem, supra note 43 (arguing that mandatory AZT treatment for
pregnant women violates constitutional rights). See generally Brown, supra note 1.
57. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); In re Madyun,
114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233; State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); In
re Milland, 548 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Fam. Ct. 1989); In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fam.
Ct. 1985); In re “Male” R., 422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Fam. Ct. 1979); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d
935 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1986) (explaining that a state must have the ability to regulate
pregnancy behavior to ensure that the state’s interest has meaning).
58. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1419 (1991)
(arguing that minority women are less able to comply with regulations and therefore
the most affected by government regulation); see also Charles Abraham & Paschal
Sheeran, The Health Brief, in PREDICTING HEALTH BEHAVIOR: RESEARCH AND
PRACTICE WITH SOCIAL COGNITION MODELS 23, 23 (Mark Conner & Peter Norman
eds., Open University Press 1st ed. 1996) (contending that researchers have found
evidence that ethnicity plays a role in whether an individual will take preventative
health steps).
59. See Abraham & Sheeran, supra note 58, at 23.
60. See Janice Blanchard & Nicole Lurie, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Patient Reports of
Disrespect in the Health Care Setting and Its Impact on Care, 53 J. FAM. PRAC. 721,
727 (2004) (reporting that minorities with lower incomes and lower education levels
were more likely to feel discriminated against in healthcare situations and less likely to
follow physician orders).
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white women.61 These characteristics translate into differences in the way
minority women decide to engage in specific health behaviors, including
pregnancy decisions, in comparison to white women. For example, a
minority woman, who is likely to have a lower socioeconomic status than
most white women, may not be able to afford to comply with some of her
doctor’s instructions.62 As a result, pregnancy regulation has the potential
to negatively impact health decisions made by minorities to a greater
degree than decisions made by white women. Specifically, these
characteristics either predispose women to be more likely to violate
pregnancy regulations or dissuade women from seeking prenatal medical
care.
The purpose of the following section is threefold. First, it will describe
how people weigh different health options and arrive at decisions about
their health behavior. Second, it will outline how three characteristics—
socioeconomic status, doctor mistrust, and arrest rates—influence minority
women’s decisions about their health behavior. Finally, it will describe
how minority women are more predisposed than white women to violating
pregnancy-related legal regulations because of their health decisions.
A. Health Decision-Making
Extensive research has shown that the HBM accurately explains and
predicts an individual’s participation in a variety of health behaviors.63 The
HBM focuses on how an individual’s attitudes and beliefs encourage or
discourage particular health-related choices.64 Specifically, the HBM is
based on the following three questions that an individual must consider in
relation to a particular health condition and health behavior: (1) can the
negative health outcome be avoided; (2) does avoidance of the negative
outcome require the performance of a particular health action; and, (3) can

61. See generally L. Ebony Boulware et al., Race and Trust in the Health Care
System, 118 PUB. HEALTH REP. 358, 360-62 (2003) (describing differences in the level
of trust a patient has in his or her doctor depending on the race of the patient); see also
Patrick R. Clifford, Drug Use, Drug Prohibition and Minority Communities, 12 J.
PRIMARY PREVENTION 303 (1992) (providing statistics on the rate of arrests of white
people in comparison to minority arrests); Jeffrey G. Ghassemi, Not Just Black and
White: New Efforts Look More Deeply into Racial Comparisons of Health Care,
WASH. POST, July 25, 2006, at F01.
62. See Heather Antecol & Kelly Bedard, The Racial Wage Gap: The Importance
of Labor Force Attachment Differences Across Black, Mexican, and White Men, 39 J.
HUM. RESOURCES, 564, 566, 568 (2004).
63. See generally KAREN GLANZ & BARBARA K. RIMER, THEORY AT A GLANCE: A
GUIDE FOR HEALTH PROMOTION PRACTICE 18-20 (2d ed. 2007) (outlining the Health
Belief Model); Abraham & Sheeran, supra note 58 (detailing the Health Behavior
Model); Ivan Rosenstock, Historical Origins of the Health Belief Model, 2 HEALTH
EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 328 (1974) (describing the Health Belief Model).
64. See Abraham & Sheeran, supra note 58, at 25.
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the particular health action be accomplished.65 If an individual answers
“yes” to all of these questions, then the individual may be capable of
achieving positive health outcomes, or at least avoiding negative
outcomes.66 However, barriers often interfere with the confidence an
individual has in answering “yes” to these questions.
Minority individuals, because of factors associated with minority status,
sometimes do not believe they have the ability to perform behaviors
necessary to avoid negative health conditions. Overall, minority women,
when compared to white women, generally have a lower socioeconomic
status,67 have lower levels of trust in the medical system,68 and are arrested
at much higher rates than white women.69 These factors limit the
probability that pregnant minority women will be able to avoid certain
negative health outcomes for their fetus. In terms of the HBM, these
characteristics could prevent women from recognizing what behaviors are
necessary to avoid such negative outcomes, or could cause women to
believe that they are incapable of performing a necessary behavior. For
example, a woman’s low socioeconomic status may lead her to believe that
she is incapable of participating in an expensive prenatal procedure a
doctor recommends. Essentially, factors that characterize many minority
women, such as low SES, low trust in the medical system, and high rates of
legal problems and arrests, influence their decisions regarding health
behavior.
B. Differences in the Level of Trust Women Have in the Medical System
Research has established that significant racial differences exist in how
much individuals trust the medical community.70 One study included a
telephone survey that asked white, black, Latino, and Asian patients to

65. See id. at 36-43.
66. See id.
67. See Stephen Ohlemacher, Race Still Divides U.S., Census Says: Disparities

Widening in Incomes, Education, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 2006, at 3 [hereinafter
Ohlemacher, Race Still Divides].
68. See Boulware, supra note 61, at 360-62 (contending that minorities are less
likely to trust the medical system).
69. See ALLEN J. BECK & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 1998 2, 8, 10 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p98.pdf (explaining that non-Hispanic black women are
incarcerated at a rate of 200 per 100,000, compared to the rate of 25 per 100,000 for
white non-hispanic women); Roberts, supra note 58, at 1419 (arguing that black
women face a greater risk of being tested for drugs during pregnancy than white
women); see also Antecol & Bedard, supra note 62, at 564; Boulware, supra note 61,
at 360-62 (contending that minorities are less likely to trust the medical community);
Ohlemacher, Race Still Divides, supra note 67.
70. See Boulware, supra note 61, at 360-62 (asserting that research shows racial
differences in levels of trust toward the medical system).
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assess their satisfaction in their physician on a variety of dimensions,
including their level of trust in the relationship.71 This study found that
black respondents were less likely to trust their physicians than nonHispanic white respondents, and were also more likely to be concerned
about personal privacy and the potential for harmful experimentation in
hospitals.72 Additional studies have found that black, Asian, and Latino
patients experience more disrespect from the medical community than
white patients.73 In addition, minorities are more likely to feel that they
would have received better care if they were of a different race.74
Because minority women often mistrust their doctors, they are more
likely than white women to have one of two thoughts when evaluating their
health behavior according to the HBM: (1) they may not believe that
certain decisions are necessary to avoid a negative health outcome, or
(2) they may believe that they cannot perform the behavior necessary to
avoid the negative health outcome. For example, a minority woman who
has little trust in the medical system may not believe that AZT treatment
will be effective in preventing HIV transmission to her fetus, or she may
believe that there are too many negative side effects of the drug. Thus, the
HBM would predict that in this instance, the woman does not believe that
this particular health behavior is necessary to avoid a possible negative
health outcome (i.e., transmitting HIV to her fetus). In essence, she weighs
the costs, such as side effects, and the benefits, such as the possible
prevention of HIV transmission, associated with the health behavior. Her
conclusion, based on how she weighs the costs and benefits, affects her
decision whether to engage in this health behavior.
If a woman fears that her doctor will make her do something against her
will or report her to the police, her relationship with the doctor will be
harmed. This is a significant problem where mandatory reporting policies
are in place (e.g., a doctor is required to report a drug-user who is
pregnant).75 Due to beliefs commonly held by minority women, it is
probable that they will not weigh and consider the information and
recommendations given by their doctor in the same way as white women.76
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See generally Blanchard & Lurie, supra note 60, at 725 (observing that 14% of

Blacks, 19% of Asians, and 20% of Latinos surveyed reported disrespectful treatment
from the medical system).
74. See id.
75. See Logan, supra note 20, at 133; see also Terry Adirim & Nandini San Gupta,
A National Survey of State and Maternal and Newborn Drug Testing and Reporting
Policies, 106 PUB. HEALTH REP. 292, 293 (1991) (stating that reporting policies might
result in state custody of infants or abuse charges against mothers).
76. See Boulware, supra note 61, at 360-64 (observing that minorities are less
likely to trust physicians and that a lack of trust affects perceptions of treatment and
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Therefore, minority women are more likely to reject their doctor’s advice
and, as a result, face criminal prosecution.
C. Differences in Socioeconomic Status
In addition to differences in the levels of trust in doctors, minority and
white women also differ overall in socioeconomic status. Race, ethnicity,
and socioeconomic status are closely intertwined in the United States.77
Minorities generally occupy a lower socioeconomic position within the
United States than whites.78 Minority and low socioeconomic status are
associated with lower quality housing, nutrition, and education.79 As a
result, pregnant minority women are likely to weigh the consequences of
their decisions differently than pregnant white women.
Lower socioeconomic status corresponds to low-paying job
opportunities, which often do not provide benefits such as health insurance
or paid vacation; instead, they merely offer hourly pay, often at the
minimum wage. As a result, a pregnant woman must consider potential
economic costs when deciding whether to engage in pregnancy behaviors
(e.g., receiving a C-section) that will affect her employment. A woman in
need of a C-section must consider the need to take unpaid time off from
work to recover from surgery. Additionally, the expense of C-sections
poses a significant burden on a woman without health insurance.80 Women
who undergo AZT treatment face similar problems; the side effects of AZT
may cause women to miss work and could present an added medical
expense.81
In addition, the majority of court-ordered C-sections, ordered without a
written opinion from the court to create legal precedent, involved minority
women.82 Specifically, in 80% of these cases, the women affected were
black, Latino, or Asian, and 27% of these women did not speak English as

possibly decision-making).
77. See Ghassemi, supra note 61, at F01.
78. See Ohlemacher, Race Still Divides, supra note 67.
79. See generally Ghassemi, supra note 61, at F01; Ohlemacher, Race Still Divides,
supra note 67.
80. See Diane E. Judge, C-Section on Demand: A Good Idea?, 709 J. WATCH
WOMEN’S HEALTH (2003) (stating that a C-section is “considerably more expensive
than [a] vaginal delivery”).
81. See Enid Vázquez, Side Effect Chart: An Abbreviated At-a-Glance Guide to
Potential HIV Drug Side Effects, POSITIVELY AWARE, Jan.-Feb. 2007, 53, 53 (stating
that possible side effects of AZT are “[h]eadaches, fever, chills, muscle soreness,
fatigue, nausea, fingernail discoloration, anemia, and neutropenia”).
82. See Veronika E.B. Kolder, Janet Gallagher & Michael T. Parsons, CourtOrdered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1192 (1987) (listing
fifteen cases of court-ordered Caesarean operations).
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their primary language.83 All of the women in these cases were treated in a
teaching hospital or received public assistance.84 The HBM specifies that
in order to avoid a negative health outcome, individuals must believe that
they are capable of performing the necessary health behavior.85 Due to
their lower SES, it is likely that these women did not believe they were able
to have a C-section.
Because of their lower economic status, minority women, more than
their white counterparts, may conclude that the potential economic costs of
the conduct suggested by their doctor are not worth the potential health
benefits of the conduct. This suggests that because of their socioeconomic
status, minority women may be at a higher risk of criminal prosecution for
violating laws governing pregnancy-related behavior, and may also be
forced to engage in more undesirable behavior than white women.
D. Differences in Rates of Arrest
Although drug use transcends all racial, socioeconomic, and geographic
lines, minorities are disproportionately targeted for drug-related arrests,
such that minority arrest rates for drug offenses are five times higher than
for whites.86 Black individuals constitute 37.3% of arrests for drug
possession.87 Additionally, while the rates of drug use among black and
white pregnant women are similar, the majority of women reported to
authorities for exposing their fetuses to illegal substances were black.88
This means that a black woman is significantly more likely to be tested for
drug use during pregnancy than a white woman. In addition, minority and
low-income women are more likely than white women to be required to
undergo drug testing during pregnancy.89
As a result, minority women may not go to doctors because they are
afraid of being prosecuted, whereas white women, who are less likely to be
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id.
See id.
See Rosenstock, supra note 63, at 328.
See generally BECK & MUMOLA, supra note 69 (describing statistics
establishing racial disparities in federal and state custody); Alfred Blumstein, Racial
Disproportionality of U.S. Prisons Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743,
751 (1993) (describing differences in arrest rates among minorities and whites and
other factors associated with these arrest rates, such as location and policing trends).
87. See Fed. Bureau of Investigations, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Crime in the United
States, 1998: Uniform Crime Reports 209, 209 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1998).
88. See Roberts, supra note 58, at 1434 (explaining that despite little difference in
substance abuse, black women are still ten times more likely than white women to be
reported to health officials for drug abuse); Gina Kolota, Racial Bias Seen on Pregnant
Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at A13.
89. See Kolota, supra note 88 (suggesting that the disparity is partly because blacks
go to public hospitals, which are more likely to drug test and report those results than
private hospitals).
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prosecuted, may not share this fear. According to the HBM, because a
minority woman is more likely to fear prosecution, she is less likely to
believe she is capable of performing the necessary health behavior—going
to see a doctor. She may forego vital prenatal care in order to avoid the
risk of criminal prosecution or drug testing, which may, in turn,
significantly endanger her fetus.90 The bias that exists in pregnancy
regulation may, therefore, disproportionately harm the health of a minority
woman, as well as the health of her fetus.
The evidence presented suggests that statutes and laws governing
pregnancy behavior unfairly—even if unintentionally—negatively
influence the pregnancy decisions and outcomes of minority women, which
can lead to disproportionate harm in comparison to white women.
Specifically, factors such as low socioeconomic status, lower trust in the
medical community, and high arrest rates, may weigh upon the decisions
minorities make about various health behaviors related to their pregnancy.91
Due to these societal-level factors that characterize many minority women,
their decisions regarding pregnancy behavior are not likely to align with the
laws and policies that regulate pregnancy. As a result, the constitutional
rights of minority women may be marginalized more often. Additionally,
minority women may forego necessary treatment and care in order to avoid
prosecution. Policy changes must be made to prevent the negative
consequences that arise from pregnancy regulation.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The social issues discussed in this article—HIV transmission, drug use
during pregnancy, and fetal harm—are serious problems. The existing
punitive legal actions discussed, however, are not the best way to address
these problems. Such legal action has the potential not only to violate
women’s constitutional rights, but to affect minority women
disproportionately. The HBM predicts that the previously discussed
factors, which characterize many minority women, may predispose them to
making poor decisions regarding their pregnancy, affecting the way they
make health decisions. As a result, minority women are more likely to be
affected by statutes and regulations governing pregnancy behavior.92 To
90. See Greg Alexander & Carol Korenbrot, The Role of Prenatal Care in
Preventing Low Birth Weight, 5 FUTURE CHILD 103, 105 (1995) (discussing the link
between low birth weight and prenatal care).
91. See Boulware, supra note 61, at 362; Clifford, supra note 61, at 312; Ghassemi,
supra note 61, at F01 (establishing other factors pregnant minority women might
consider, including increased likelihood of prison time if caught with drugs, their
knowledge of historical race discrimination in the medical field, and their low
socioeconomic status).
92. See generally Roberts, supra note 58, at 1434-52 (discussing the ways in which
regulations make minority women turn away from optimal health choices: prosecutorial
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reduce the disproportionate impact that pregnancy regulations and statutes
have on the lives of minority women, the specific characteristics that
contribute to the problem must be addressed. The following section will
discuss ways in which low socioeconomic status, mistrust in the medical
community, and high arrest rates, can be reduced.
A. The Role of Socioeconomic Status in Eliminating Bias
in the Legal System
The first way to reduce the disproportionate harm that many minorities
experience is to address the general socioeconomic gap between minorities
and the white majority. Minorities have comparatively lower incomes than
whites.93 To improve socioeconomic status for minority groups, more
money, at state and federal levels, needs to be funneled into improving the
welfare system in low-income communities. Research has found that in the
United States, welfare-to-work program recipients are more likely to work
consistently and attain a higher paying job in comparison to welfare
recipients not involved in a welfare-to-work program.94 Welfare-to-work
programs can increase the probability that minority women will be able to
earn a livable salary, thereby reducing concerns over the financial costs that
accompany pregnancy behavior decisions.
In addition, the federal government should provide money to improve
the Medicaid system and encourage lower paying employers to provide
health insurance.95 This would increase the quality of medical care for all
women of low socioeconomic status. By improving the Medicaid system,
the financial burden associated with medical decisions would be
significantly lessened.

focus on crack cocaine isolates minorities; historical racial discrimination means blacks
gravitate toward public hospitals that implement drug testing; the lack of formal
screening processes at hospitals; and the racially discriminatory arrest statistics).
93. See Stephen Ohlemacher, Whites’ Income 2/3 Higher Than Blacks’: Racial
Gaps Continue—Some Increase, CHI.-SUN TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, at 22 (reporting that,
according to the Census Bureau, white households had incomes that were two-thirds
higher than blacks and 40% higher than Hispanics); see also Griff Witte & Nell
Henderson, Wealth Gap Widens for Blacks, Hispanics: Significant Ground Lost After
Recession, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2004, at A11 (noting that “[t]he widening wealth gap
underscores the vast differences in the economic well-being of minority and white
families”).
94. See GAYLE HAMILTON ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: NATIONAL EVALUATION OF WELFARE-TO-WORK
STRATEGIES (2001).
95. But see Lisa Dubay & Genevieve Kenney, A National Study of the Impacts of
Medicaid Expansions for Pregnant Women, Urban Institute Working Paper 6217-11
(Washington: The Urban Institute, 1995) (suggesting research has established that
despite expansions of the Medicaid program, these expansions made little impact on
the health outcomes of pregnant women; specifically, the rates of adequate prenatal
care and low birth-weight births were unaffected).
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Improving minority women’s socioeconomic status and satisfying their
healthcare needs would allow them to worry less about the financial cost of
medical care. It would also allow minority women to make medical
decisions based on health concerns, instead of financial ones. Relieving
these financial burdens will increase the probability that women will
answer “yes” to the questions that comprise the HBM, reducing the chance
that they will violate pregnancy regulations.
B. The Role of Increasing Trust in Eliminating Bias in the Legal System
Another way to reduce the bias against minority women is to reduce the
mistrust between doctors and minority patients. Research shows that many
minority patients mistrust their physicians.96 One way that federal and state
governments can reduce this mistrust is to create programs encouraging
minorities to pursue careers in the medical field, particularly because
minorities are significantly underrepresented in the medical profession.97
Research has indicated that minority patients have a more positive
experience in racially-concordant medical relationships.98 Thus, increasing
the number of minority doctors may result in more concordant pairings and
encourage trust within doctor-minority patient relationships. This may
further encourage minorities to follow their doctor’s advice, thus reducing
negative health outcomes.
Language barriers and cultural differences can also contribute to mistrust
between doctors and minority patients.99 In areas with large populations of
non-English speaking patients, medical offices should employ interpreters.
Additionally, research has determined that many doctors recognize the
importance of cultural training.100 Training could increase their ability to
recognize characteristics associated with other cultures, thus fostering
96. See Boulware, supra note 61, at 362 (statistics show black respondents were
less likely than their white counterparts to trust their physicians).
97. See Donald L. Libby, Zijun Zhou & David A. Kindig, Will Minority Physician
Supply Meet U.S. Needs: Projections for Reaching Racial Parity of Physicians to
Population, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. at 205 (showing only 3.56% of physicians
identified themselves as black).
98. See Lisa Cooper et al., Patient-Centered Communication, Ratings of Care, and
Concordance of Patient and Physician Race, 139 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 907,
910-11 (2003) (studies show race-concordant visits were longer, both parties spoke
slower and patients were more likely to be satisfied with their visit and willing to
recommend the physician to others).
99. See, e.g., J. A. Chilton et al., Cervical Cancer Among Vietnamese Women:
Efforts to Define the Problem Among Houston’s Population, 99 GYNECOLOGIC
ONCOLOGY S203, S205 (2005) (citing language barriers as a reason why Vietnamese
women were not being properly screened for cervical cancer).
100. See, e.g., Joel S. Weissman et al., Resident Physicians’ Preparedness to
Provide Cross-Cultural Care, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1058, 1063 (half of doctors
reported they had little or no training in understanding how to address patients from
different cultures).
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better communication in the relationship.101 Educational media designed to
encourage minority women to trust their doctors may also be effective in
enhancing trust. This may increase the probability that minority women
will be able to answer “yes” to the questions that comprise the HBM, and
thus make better health choices.
C. The Role of Lowering Arrest Rates in Eliminating Bias
in the Legal System
Arrest rates also contribute to the disproportionate effects that pregnancy
statutes and regulations have on minorities since minority women are
arrested for drug-related offenses at substantially higher rates than white
women.102 This is closely related to the issue of trust; if women fear that
doctors will report them to the authorities, they will be less likely to trust
doctors. In addition to being arrested at higher rates, minority women are
drug-tested more frequently in the peripartum setting, and positive drug
tests may lead to prosecution.103 To address this social issue, the federal
and state governments need to work to eliminate the bias displayed by the
medical community in testing minority women. Specifically, policy
makers should fund training programs that emphasize racial sensitivity and
focus on eliminating discrimination. These programs should be designed
specifically for medical staff and should focus on how to avoid
discriminatory behavior when performing the duties of their job.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the United States, legal regulation of pregnancy behaviors is
controversial.104 In addition to violating women’s constitutional rights, the
legal regulation of pregnancy behaviors involves unfair biases against
minority women. Societal-level changes must be made to reduce racial
bias successfully. The changes necessary to reduce racial bias require a
massive shift in public values, as well as a reprioritization of issues by
federal and state governments. Specifically, the policy recommendations
discussed in this article will help women to base health decisions on
medical advice from their doctor, and not on financial concerns, fear of
101. See id. at 1064.
102. See Roberts, supra note 58, at 1453 (arguing that the disparity between the

number of blacks prosecuted and the percentage of pregnant substance abusers is racial
discrimination).
103. See Hillary Veda Kunins et al., The Effect of Race on Provider Decisions to
Test for Illicit Drug Use in the Peripartum Setting, 16 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 245, 248
(2007) (study shows black women were 1.5 times more likely to be tested for illicit
drugs than non-black women).
104. See GOMEZ, supra note 1; Ayers, supra note 1, at 301; Bornstein, supra note 1,
at 227.
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arrest, or mistrust. Although this goal seems lofty, the public must work
toward eliminating the biases present in the legal system to avoid targeting
certain groups for greater prosecution, and to provide a better quality of life
for pregnant minority women. Although these changes are formidable,
they are necessary to protect the constitutional rights of all pregnant
women.
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